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right to treatment. 82 Such large judgments against the state, unlike small
damage judgments against hospital officials, may coerce state legislatures
into funding and organizing their mental health facilities more adequately.83
Future class actions of the type involved in Wyatt can also use the Donaldson analysis in support of their claims. The Wyatt attempt to judicially
reorganize a state mental hospital will have a greater effect than any in84
dividual damage judgment against the state.
In conclusion, the significance of the Donaldson opinion lies not in
its effect upon the bringing of future individual actions against hospital
officials, but in its formulation of a well-reasoned analysis establishing a
constitutional right to treatment. This analysis can be used in the future
in actions seeking more effective and far-reaching forms of relief than the
particular relief sought and granted in Donaldson.
Brian S. North
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Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. (U.S. 1974)
Kewanee Oil Co. (Kewanee), plaintiff petitioner, brought suit against

Bicron Corp. (Bicron) and several former Kewanee employees in the
United States District Court for the Northern )istrict of Ohio, seeking
injunctive relief and damages for the misappropriation of trade secrets.1
After 17 years of research, an unincorporated division of Kewanee, Harshaw
Chemical Co. (Harshaw), had developed a method to grow a specific
82. In Whitree, as a case in point, the plaintiff was confined for over 14 years in
a state mental hospital, receiving little treatment. The court allowed recovery on a
false imprisonment theory, reasoning that if the patient had received adequate treatment, he would have been released after several years. Id. at 701, 290 N.Y'.S.2d at 495.
The Donaldson analysis would at least support such a holding, if not obviate resort to
common law theories by raising the level of analysis to the constitutional plane.
83. However, attempted judicial coercion may prove counterproductive. The
legislature, rather than improving the level of treatment given to patients, may decide
to direct the release of the patients or direct that no additional persons in need of
treatment be committed. Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to
Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87, 112 (1967).
84. For the establishment of minimum institutional standards by the judiciary,
see Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (N.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
1. Jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1970). Due to the nature of this action, the district court, whose opinion was unreported, impounded the exhibits and the findings of fact to preserve their secrecy. See
Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Petitioner's Brief]. A summary of the factual background may
be found in the court of appeals opinion. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 478
F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1973).
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type of 17-inch crystal useful in detection devices. 2 The individual defendants were former employees of Harshaw who had either formed or
later joined Bicron.a The district court, applying Ohio law, 4 permanently
enjoined the defendants from disclosing and/or using 20 of the 40 trade
secrets in question,5 holding that Kewanee had a protectable property right
in them, and that the defendants Bicron and its employees had appropriated
some or all of the protected trade secrets.0 On appeal, 7 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the case
for dismissal of the complaint, holding that although the trial judge had
not been clearly erroneous in his factual determination that 20 of the
claimed trade secrets were protectable trade secrets under Ohio law,8 a
state trade secret law which granted an inventor a temporally unlimited
monopoly of a device which was an appropriate subject for consideration
under patent law,0 was in direct conflict with the patent laws, and therefore ineffective by authority of the supremacy clause of the United States
2. The revolutionary process involved the synthesis of sodium iodide thallium
activated scintillation crystals, which are utilized in various detection procedures,
including the detection of uranium ore, the location of oil, and the location of cancerous tumors. See Petitioner's Brief at 5-6 & n.30.
3. Each of the individual defendants had been involved with the research and
development of the crystals. As a condition of employment, the defendants had
executed at least one agreement whereby they promised not to disclose confidential
information or trade secrets obtained while employed by Harshaw. Nine months after
forming Bicron, the defendants began growing 17-inch crystals. 478 F.2d at 1076.
4. Id. at 1077. Since there is no federal trade secret law, the Ohio law of trade
secrets was applied under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Ohio law provides:
No person, having obtained possession of an article representing a trade secret
or access thereto with the owner's consent, shall convert such article to his own
use or that of another person, or thereafter without the owner's consent make or
cause to be made a copy of such article, or exhibit such article to another.
OHIo REV. ConE ANN. § 1333.51(c) (Page 1967).
5. See 478 F.2d at 1076. The injunction was to expire as to any trade secret
which was revealed or released to the public by the plaintiff, or as to any trade secret
which was discovered by independent means. Petitioner's Brief at 27.
6. See 478 F.2d at 1076.
7. Kewanee claimed on appeal that all 40 of the trade secrets in question should
have been granted protection. Bicron claimed that: (1) Kewanee had disclosed information to the public through a magazine article, thereby removing the requisite
element of secrecy; and (2) state trade secret protection was preempted by operation
of the federal patent laws. Id. at 1077-78.
8. The court reviewed the trial judge's findings of fact pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a). The court incorporated by reference a full discussion of Ohio trade
secret law found in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Hargadine, 392 F.2d 9 (6th Cir. 1968). 478
F.2d at 1077.
9. 478 F.2d at 1078. It was not clear from the facts whether Kewanee's process
could have been termed "patentable subject matter," that is, a discovery with such
characteristics that it could be considered for a patent under federal law. See note 17
and accompanying text infra. Counsel for Kewanee conceded in the lower court that
the process was an appropriate subject for patent consideration and the court of
appeals specifically limited its decision to the issue of the validity of trade secret protection to patentable subject matter. 478 F.2d at 1078. In any event, Kewanee never
applied for a patent and, since it publicly used the process for more than a year, was
no longer entitled to one. See note 18 infra.
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Constitution. 10 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari," and in a 5-3 decision, Mr. Justice Powell not participating, reversed the decision of the court of appeals and ordered the district court's
injunction reinstated, holding that the patent clause did not grant exclusive
power to regulate discoveries to Congress, and that Ohio's trade secret
law, because it served a local interest in fair competition and did not clash
with the objectives and operation of federal patent law, was not preempted
by virtue of the extent of the protective scheme enacted by Congress.
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 ('1974).
The discoverer of a new process, machine, or design has traditionally
had the benefits of a dual system of protection to ensure that his discovery
is not misappropriated. One system, patent law, was developed under a
federal statutory scheme. The other system, trade secret protection, de1-2
veloped under state common law principles of unfair competition.
The federal statutory system of protection is grounded in the Constitution, which grants to the Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In3
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.'1
14
Pursuant to this grant of power, Congress enacted the Patent Act,
which provides a procedure whereby a patentee receives an exclusive, legal
monopoly on the patented item for a limited time, 15 in exchange for public
disclosure of the essentials of his invention. 16 In order to be considered
for a patent, a patentee must show that his discovery consists of patentable
10. 478 F.2d at 1086-87. See U.S.

CONST.

art. VI, cl.2.

11. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 414 U.S. 818 (1973). The question presented by petitioner was whether any state trade secret law conflicted with the policies
of the patent laws rather than the narrow question decided by the court of appeals of
the validity of trade secret protection of patentable subject matter (see note 9 supra).
12. For an excellent discussion of the relationship of trade secret protection and
patent protection, see 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: TRADE SECRETS
§§ 8.02-03 (1947) [hereinafter cited as MILGRIM].
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970). For an extensive (eight volumes) treatise
on patent law, see A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS (2d ed. 1964).
15. Generally, the patentee enjoys "the right to exclude others from making,
using, or selling the invention" for a period of 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). In
the case of a design patent, the grant may be for a term of 3 years and 6 months, 7
years, or 14 years. Id. § 173.
16. At the expiration of the patent, the patentee loses his exclusive rights in the
patented article. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co.,
326 U.S. 249, 256 (1945). In addition, in order to acquire a patent, the specifications
of the article must be disclosed to the extent that anyone familiar with the art could
manufacture the article. 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112 (1970). Universal Oil Co. v. Globe
Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
For an extensive discussion of the policies behind the patent laws, see Doerfer,
The Limits on Trade Secret Law Imposed by FederalPatent and Antitrust Supremacy,
80 HARv. L. REV. 1432, 1440-47 (1967). The author suggests that the objectives behind
the enactment and enforcement of the patent laws are the encouragement of innovation,
the encouragement of disclosure to the public, the encouragement of competition, and
the provision of a uniform standard of patentability. Id. See also Note, Patent Preemption of Trade Secret Protection of Inventions Meeting Judicial Standards of
Patentability,
HARv. L.
REV. Widger
807, 819
(1974).
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subject matter, defined to be a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 17 Once a discovery meets this standard, it must satisfy additional requirements relating
to the quality of the invention and its use before a patent will be granted.1 8
Within the state system of protection, the discoverer of an idea may
claim that his discovery merits trade secret protection. The most widely
accepted definition of a trade secret is contained in the Restatement of Torts:
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it.19
The protection offered to the owner of a trade secret has traditionally
depended upon the judicial view of what is a protectable trade secret interest. 20 Initially, the consensus was that a trade secret was a form of
property and could be protected as such. 21 However, this view was modified
in later decisions, resulting in a focus upon the essential wrongs involved
in the appropriation of trade secrets - either a breach of confidence, or
the utilization of improper means to acquire the secret. 22 Furthermore,
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970). Nonpatentable subject matter has been said to include

such diverse items as customer lists, market research studies, internal business organizational methods, and production techniques. 2 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES §§ 52.1-2, 62.2 (3d ed. 1968)
[hereinafter cited as
CALLMANN] ; Doerfer, supra note 16, at 1437.
18. The discovery or invention must possess, by demanding standards, the qualities of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-03 (1970). If the
subject of the patent application has been in public use for more than 1 year, it is
ineligible for a patent. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970). Chemithon Corp. v. Procter &
Gamble Co., 287 F. Supp. 291, 308 (D.C. Md. 1968), aff'd, 427 F.2d 893 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970). Even after the grant of a patent, its validity
may be challenged in the courts in a variety of ways. The success of these challenges
has been relatively high. See Mahon, Trade Secrets and Patents Compared, 50 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 536, 540 (1968).

19.

RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 757, comment b at 5 (1939).

20. For a discussion of early trade secret law, see Orenbuch, Trade Secrets and
the Patent Laws, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 638 (1970).

21. Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452 (1868) ; Tabor v. Hoffman, 118 N.Y. 30,

23 N.E. 12 (1889).

In Peabody, an employee signed an agreement, whereby he

promised not to reveal information concerning his employer's trade secrets obtained
while employed. The court enjoined the employee from revealing such information
after he had left the employer, and stated: "If [the employer] invents or discovers,
and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject for a patent or
not . . . he has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect

....

"

98

Mass. at 458.
The commentators are sharply divided upon the issue of whether a trade
secret is property. Compare Adelman & Jaress, Inventions and the Law of Trade
Secrets After Lear v. Adkins, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 77, 84 (1969) with MILGRIM,

supra note 12, § 1.01(2). The courts continue to recognize that a trade secret is
property, or alternatively, that the possessor of a trade secret has a property right in
it. See, e.g., Speedry Chem. Prods., Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328, 330 (2d

Cir. 1962) ; A.0. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 539 (6th
Cir. 1934).

22. E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917). Justice

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol20/iss1/9
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the courts have recognized the inherent frailty of the protectable trade
secret interest, and have consistently refused to protect ideas which do not
have the requisite elements of secrecy and minimal novelty, 23 or which

24
have been discovered independently.
Recognizing the value of this dual system of protection, the Supreme
Court allowed the peaceful coexistence of patent and trade secret protection for many years. 25 This coexistence was threatened by a series of
Supreme Court decisions beginning with the companion cases of Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 26 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. 27 Both cases involved suits for patent infringement and unfair competition.28 The articles in question had been granted design patents, and

is not property . . . but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs .... ." Id. at 102.
Trade secret protection is generally granted when the trade secret has been
revealed through a breach of a confidential relationship, through a breach of contract,
either express or implied, or through the implementation of improper means. Atlantic
Wool Combing Co. v. Norfolk Mills, Inc., 357 F.2d 866, 868-69 (1st Cir. 1966);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). See also CALLMANN, supra note 17, at §§
51.2, 56; Comment, The Viability of Trade Secret Protection After Lear v. Adkins,
16 VILL. L. REV. 551, 558-67 (1971).
23. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920);
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939). The commentators and courts
generally agree that in order for an idea or process to receive protection it must
be a secret. See, e.g., Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., Inc., 344 F.2d 730 (8th
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 977 (1966); CALLMANN, supra note 17, § 53.3;
Comment, The Scott Amendment to the Patent Revision Act: Should Trade Secrets
Receive Federal Protectionf, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 900, 907-12 (1971). At least one
decision indicated that the owner of the trade secret must be scrupulous in his protection of the secret. E.W. Bliss v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., 408 F.2d 1108 (8th Cir. 1969).
Although courts do not demand the degree of novelty required for patents, some
minimal degree of advance over prior art is required. See Monolith Portland Midwest
Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd,
407 F.2d 288 (9th Cir. 1969).
24. Trade secret protection has not been granted against one who either discovers the secret independently, or discovers the idea through reverse engineering,
which involves disassembly or analysis of the product containing the secret to discover
its details. See Northern Petrochem. Co. v. Tomlinson, 484 F.2d 1057 (7th Cir.
1973); Hampton v. Blair Mfg. Co., 374 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
829 (1967) ; Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 33 Ill. 2d 379, 212 N.E.2d 865 (1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 959 (1966).
25. See, e.g., Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484
(1944) ; Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, 279 U.S. 388, 391 (1929) ; Board of Trade
v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1905).
26. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
27. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
28. The law of unfair competition is a judicially created doctrine forbidding unethical business practices. See generally J. CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION §§ 601-07 (1970).
The specific aspect of this body of law involved in
Sears and Compco was the principle of state law that once the public and the trade
associate a particular design with one manufacturer, a competitor may not copy the
distinctive design so as to confuse and deceive purchasers into believing that the
competitor's product is that of the original manufacturer. 376 U.S. at 227; id. at 235.
In each case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants, by copying and selling an item
sold by the plaintiffs, had infringed the respective patents held by the plaintiff, and
were guilty of unfair competition under the theory outlined above. Id. at 226; id. at 235.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974

5

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1974], Art. 9

230

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 20

had been sold in the public market.29 In each case, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit had held that, even if the patents were invalid, the0
owners were entitled to protection under state unfair competition law.3
The Supreme Court declared the patents invalid in both decisions, and
specifically held that state law could not, without conflicting with an area
of exclusive federal control, protect a product from being copied once it
had been placed in the open market without valid patent protection.3 ' Mr.
Justice Black, writing for the majority in each case, bluntly declared in
Sears that states could not provide protection, such as the prohibition of
unfair competition, which would clash with the objectives of the federal
patent laws.3 2 The impact of these decisions upon the ability of the states
to provide a local system of protection for discoveries was the subject of
much debate.

33

Having adopted an apparently strong federalist policy in the law of
patents, the Supreme Court, in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins,3 4 established the
29. Id. at 226; id. at 234-35.
30. Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963) ; DayBrite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp., 311 F.2d 26, 29 (7th Cir. 1962). In Sears,
the Seventh Circuit had stated that under Illinois law, only a showing of "the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the products" was required to prove unfair
competition. 313 F.2d at 118 n.7, citing Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corp.,
311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962) ; National Van Lines v. Dean, 288 F.2d 5, 9 (7th Cir.
1961); Independent, Nail & Packing Co., Inc. v. Stronghold Screw Prods., Inc., 205
F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir. 1953).
31. 376 U.S. at 232-33; id. at 239. The tests that have been established to
determine whether a state law is preempted are: (1) is the power expressly and
exclusively granted to the federal government by the Constitution; or (2) is that
power expressly denied to the states by the Constitution; or (3) would the existence
of such a power in the states be "absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant"
to the existence of a like one in Congress? See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
553 (1973), quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1885). The
Court in Sears held that the state law in question was preempted under the third test
because the state law clashed with the objectives of the federal patent laws. 376 U.S.
at 231. The Court in Sears stated:
Obviously a State could not, consistently with the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution, extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date or give a
patent on an article which lacked the level of invention required for federal patents.
Id. at 231 (footnote omitted).
In Compco, the Court stated: "Today we have held . . . that when an

article is unprotected by a patent or a copyright, state law may not forbid others to
copy that article." Id. at 237.
32. 376 U.S. at 231. Justice Black stated that when an article was unpatentable
it was in the public domain and could be made and sold by whomever chose to do so. Id.
33. At least one commentator believed that the effect of these decisions would be
to preclude state trade secret protection. Adelman, Trade Secrets and Federal Preemption - The Aftermath of Sears and Compco, 49 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 713, 732-33
(1967). Contra, Handler, Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong?, 64 COLUM. L.
REV. 1183 (1964); Comment, The Stiffel Doctrine and the Law of Trade Secrets,
62 Nw. U.L. REv. 956, (1968). Some commentators have argued that trade secret
protection, at least for those discoveries that could have been patented but were not,
is partially preempted under the philosophy of Sears and Compco. Adelman &
Jaress, supra note 21, at 93; Note, supra note 16, at 833-34.
34. 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
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doctrine that payments of royalties by a know-how licensee to a licensor
to whom a patent had been granted were not required during the period
between the grant of the patent and final judicial determination of the
patent's invalidity.3 5 The majority in Lear specifically avoided the issue
of the validity of the payment of royalties by the licensee during the pregrant period,36 but Justice Black, in a concurring and dissenting opinion,
indicated that any contract providing for the payment of royalties in exchange for information about a trade secret would conflict with the opera3
tion of the patent laws.

7

The problem for the lower courts was the practical application of the
Sears-Compco and Lear doctrines. Some courts held that Sears was
limited to its facts, and that state trade secret protection, at least for those
discoveries which were unpatentable or as yet unpatented, was not preempted by federal patent law.3 8 In Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 39 the
Second Circuit rationalized the continuance of a state system of trade
secret protection on the grounds that the protection given did not confer
a monopoly upon a discoverer, but merely enforced a contractual provision,
40
and only limited the contracting parties, not the rest of the industry.
Several courts adopted other various justifications for continued trade
41
secret protection before the Sixth Circuit decided Kewanee.
35. Id. at 674. Of course, if the patent is declared valid, the licensor should
receive all accrued royalties.
36. Id. at 674-75. The Court reversed and remanded the decision of the California
Supreme Court. The subsequent history is sketched in Adkins v. District Court, 431
F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1970). The issue of the validity of pre-patent payments was not
determined by the California court.
37. 395 U.S. at 676-77 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Black,
joined by Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren, stated: "The national policy
expressed in the patent laws, favoring free competition and narrowly limiting monopoly, cannot be frustrated by private agreements among individuals, with or without the approval of the State." Id. at 677. For a discussion of the impact of the Lear
decision upon trade secret protection, see Comment, supra note 22, at 556-58.
38. The fundamental reason given for distinguishing Sears and Compco in thesedecisions was that protection of trade secrets simply did not clash with the objectives.
of the patent laws. See, e.g., Water Services, Inc. v. Tesco Chem., Inc., 410 F.2d 163.
(5th Cir. 1969); Servo Corp. of America v. General Elec. Co., 337 F.2d 716 (4th,
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 934 (1966).
In Dekar Indus., Inc. v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 434 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1970),.
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 945 (1971), the Ninth Circuit held that Lear did not preclude
trade secret protection. See Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light
of Goldstein and Kewanee (Part I), 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 736, 747-53 (1973).
39. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971).
40. Id. at 223. Circuit Judge Friendly stated:
An agreement licensing a trade secret is an altogether different matter [from,
the situations in Sears and Lear]. It binds no one except the licensee; all others.
are free, as the licensee previously was, to attempt by fair means to figure out
what the secret is and, if they succeed, to practice it.
Id. For a more extensive discussion of the Painton decision, see 17 VILL. L. RZv..
376 (1971).
41. See Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORN. L. REv. 161, 189 n.178 (1970), where
the author lists 24 cases which distinguish the Sears doctrine from the protection.
offered to trade secrets. Among the practices forbidden in those cases where breaches
of confidential relationships, misappropriations, and industrial espionage. See alsonote by
35 Villanova
supra. University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1974
Published
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Within this historical context, the instant Court was confronted with
the issue of "whether state trade secret protection is pre-empted by operation of the federal patent law."' 42 Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for
the majority, 43 began his analysis of the issues by defining trade secrets
and patents and by outlining the scope of protection offered by the respective governing laws. 44 The Court then turned to a consideration of the
two central questions posed by the decision rendered by the Sixth Circuit:
1) whether the states are forbidden, by the constitutional grant of power
to Congress over discoveries, to act at all in the area of trade secret protection; and 2) whether trade secret law, specifically Ohio's, is void under
45
the supremacy clause.
In its discussion of the first issue, the Court cited its recent decision
in Goldstein v. California46 for the proposition that the Constitution did
not grant exclusive power over writings and discoveries to Congress and
that, at least in the case of writings, states could provide protection until
Congress decided to preempt the area. 47 Analogizing writings to discoveries, the Court concluded that the states enjoyed the same privileges in
the regulation of discoveries and stated:
The only limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of
patents and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the
laws in this area passed by Congress .... 48
It is submitted that the Court's analogy to state copyright protection
as discussed in Goldstein is not supported completely by that decision. In
Goldstein, the Court held that since Congress had remained silent in the
area of musical reproductions for many years, and since Congress recently
had passed legislation, which though inapplicable in Goldstein, nonetheless
provided protection similar to that afforded by the subject state, 49 state
42. 416 U.S. at 472. It should be noted that the Supreme Court had never before
been actually confronted with the issue of whether trade secret law, as opposed to
unfair competition law (as in Sears), conflicted with the patent laws. Therefore,
the Court's analysis and conclusion can be viewed as the current constitutional definition of permissible state action in the protection of trade secrets.
43. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, and
Rehnquist. Justice Marshall wrote a concurring opinion. Justices Douglas and Brennan joined in a dissenting opinion, and Justice Powell took no part in the decision.
44. 416 U.S. at 474-78. See notes 12-24 and accompanying text supra.
45. 416 U.S. at 478-79.
46. 412 U.S. 546 (1973), noted in 19 VILL. L. REV. 496 (1974). The Court in
*that decision was faced with the issue of whether a state law prohibiting record piracy
was preempted by the Constitution and the federal copyright laws. 412 U.S. at 55.
.See Wydick, Trade Secrets: Federal Preemption in Light of Goldstein and Kewanee
,(Part II - Conclusion), 56 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 4, 4-12 (1974).
47. 416 U.S. at 478.
48. Id. at 479.
49. Congress had passed the Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140,
§ 1(b), 85 Stat. 391 (Codified at 17 U.S.C. § 5(n) (Supp. 1971)) but that legislation
specifically protected only recordings fired after February 15, 1972 and before January
1, 1975, and not those recordings, like those pirated in Goldstein, made before that date.
Therefore, absent state protection, those recordings could be pirated at will. See 19
VILL. L. REv. at 501.
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protection of recordings did not conflict with federal law.5 0 The Goldstein
Court specifically distinguished between congressional action in the copyright area and congressional action in the patent area, noting that by its
extensive legislation in the latter, Congress had apparently indicated that
protection of discoveries in commercial use was solely a federal interest. 5'
Hence, by its decision in Kewanee, the Court has indicated that its view
of the permissible scope of state action in the protection of discoveries is
52
more expansive than that stated in Goldstein.
Having decided that the Constitution did not grant exclusive power
over discoveries to Congress, and that the Constitution did not specifically
deny states the power to protect discoveries, the Court then considered
the second issue, whether Congress, by enacting patent legislation, had
preempted the field, thereby rendering trade secret law void under the
supremacy clause. 53 The Court noted that if the scheme of state trade
secret protection "clashes with the objectives of the federal patent laws . . .
then the state law must fall."15 4 To determine whether state trade secret
law "clashed" with federal law, the Court analyzed first the objectives of
patent and trade secret laws, then the interaction of these separate systems
of protection."
The objectives of the patent system, as embodied in the Constitution
and the patent laws are, according to the Court: 1) to encourage research
and the development of new products and processes of manufacture by
granting exclusive rights in inventions; 2) to increase the common store
of knowledge by requiring, in exchange for the 17-year patent, full disclosure of the essentials of the invention to the public; and 3) to ensure
that all ideas in the public sector are, in fact, for the benefit of the public
unless they are protected by a patent, an objective often referred to as.
"the public domain doctrine." 56 Against this background of federal patent
law, the Court characterized the policies behind state trade secret law as:
"[1] The maintenance of standards of commercial ethics and [2] the encouragement of invention ....
-57 Additionally the Court noted that trade
50. 412 U.S. at 565-71.
51. Id. at 569-70. But see 19 VILL. L. REV. at 500, where the author states.
that although Goldstein dealt solely with copyright law, the language used by the.
majority indicated a possible shift away from the strong positions taken in Sears-.
Compco and Lear.
52. It is submitted that the issue of whether the copyright and patent clause.
forbids the states to act at all is effectively laid to rest by the decisions in Goldsteinand Kewanee, which represent a recognition of "the essentially non-uniform charcterof the appreciation of intellectual achievements in the various States." 416 U.S. at 479.
53. Id., quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
54. 416 U.S. at 480, quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225,.
231 (1964).
55. 416 U.S. at 480-82.
56. Id., quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 668 (1969). This doctrine
was discussed in the Sears and Conipco decisions. See notes 26-33 and accompanying
text supra.
57. 416 U.S. at 481, citing A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73,
F.2d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 1934).
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secret protection is important because it provides a means to promote
"increased economic efficiency within large companies . .

.,.

In its analysis of the interaction of patent and trade secret law, the
Court divided the discoveries to which trade secret law applies into two
classes: 1) those items which would not be proper subjects for consideration for patent protection, that is, unpatentable subject matter; and 2)
those items which are proper subjects for consideration, or patentable
subject matter."
As to the first class of discoveries, the Court, relying upon Goldstein,
held that "Congress, with respect to nonpatentable subject matter . . . has
left the area unattended . . . ."; and that states, absent some affirmative

congressional action, should be free to act. 60 The Court reasoned that
since patent protection is unavailable for this class of discoveries, the abolition of trade secret protection would not foster applications for patents for
these discoveries, and would not promote increased disclosure of them.
In addition, the Court reasoned that trade secret protection of customer
lists or advertising campaigns "encourages businesses to initiate new and
individualized plans of operation, and constructive competition results." 6' 1
It is submitted that the Court's reasoning and conclusion are not inconsistent with the Sears-Compco and Lear decisions on this point. Those
decisions, although often quoted as expressions of a blanket federalist
patent policy, can reasonably be construed as being limited to considerations of patent policy pertaining to items which are the proper subjects of
consideration under the patent laws. 62 Moreover, the state law involved
in Sears and Compco forbade the copying of matter within the public
domain ;63 trade secret law, on the other hand, forbids generally only the
64
disclosure of what is, by common definition, not in the public domain.
For this reason, as well as for those presented in the opinion, the Kewanee
Court's conclusion that the lack of federal protection over discoveries not
58. 416 U.S. at 482, citing Wexler v. Greenburg, 399 Pa. 569, 578-79, 160 A.2d
430, 434-35 (1960).
59. 416 U.S. at 482-83. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra.
60. 416 U.S. at 482-83, quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973).
61. 416 U.S. at 483.
62. Although the designs sought to be patented in Sears and Compco were patentable subject matter, they lacked sufficient novelty to be entitled to a patent. 376 U.S.
at 226, 235.
63. See note 28 supra. As stated previously, one principle of patent policy is that
no one should obtain a monopoly on an item otherwise in general circulation. See
note 56 supra.
64. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, comment b at 5-6 (1939). A trade secret's
value to its owner is commensurate with the degree of secrecy with which it is kept.
The trade secret loses its value and its protectability under trade secret law when it
becomes common knowledge in the industry; therefore, a trade secret cannot be in the
public domain, even though the product of a secret process, e.g., a synthetic crystal,
may be in public use. See Metallizing Eng'r Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co.,
153 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 840 (1946); Midland-Ross Corp.
v. Sunbeam Equip. Corp., 316 F. Supp. 171, 177 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd per curiam, 435
F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Wydick, supra note 38, at 740-43; Comment, supra
note 22, at 556.
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deemed to be patentable subject matter should be construed as congressional intent to permit the states to act in this area, rather than as
congressional intent that no protection at all should be afforded these
items, seems to be the more reasonable interpretation. 5
In its analysis of the second class of discoveries, that is - those items
which are proper subjects for consideration for patent protection - the
Court considered the interaction of patent policy and trade secret policy
to determine whether patentable subject matter "may also have available
the alternative protection accorded by trade secret law." 6 The Court
summarily dismissed the issues of whether trade secret law would conflict
either with the patent policy of the encouragement of invention or with
the public domain doctrine, concluding as to the former that "[t]he two
systems are not and never would be in conflict." 67 With respect to the
latter, the Court reasoned that since a trade secret is not an item available
to the public sector, trade secret protection is not incompatible in that
8
sense with patent policy.
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the dissent, vigorously opposed the
majority's reasoning relating to the policy of the public domain doctrine,
noting that the majority's decision was inconsistent with the philosophy
of Sears and Compco. According to Justice Douglas, those decisions stood
for the proposition that, absent patent protection, every article was in the
public domain and might be freely copied by all.69 Douglas reasoned that
Congress by enacting the patent laws had decided "that where no patent
70
existed, free competition should prevail."
Although Justice Douglas' concern for the maintenance of free competition was a valid one, he failed to recognize that the fundamental philosophy
behind trade secret law, in addition to that of providing a competitive
market place, is fairness. 71 Unlike the articles in Sears and Cornpco which were uncomplicated, sold in the public market, and insufficiently
novel to be afforded patent protection - an article embodying a trade
secret would remain secret, absent the utilization of improper methods to
obtain the details, or a breach of a contractual, fiduciary, or confidential
65. Section 301 of the Patent Reform Bill introduced in the 94th Congress,
B.N.A. PAT., T. & C.J. No. 209, at E-1 to E-21 (Jan. 2, 1975), expressly provides
that trade secret law is not preempted by patent statutes. Id. at E-18.
66. 416 U.S. at 483.
67. Id. at 484.
68. Id. (footnote omitted). See note 64 supra.
69. 416 U.S. at 495-99 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas stated: "We
held [in Sears] that when an article is unprotected by a patent state law may not
forbid others to copy it, because every article not covered by a valid patent is in the
public domain." Id. at 495. It should be noted, however, that this dissent agreed with
the majority's reasoning as to trade secret protection for nonpatentable items. Id.
at 497 n.3.
70. Id. at 495.
71. Cf. Handler, supra note 33, at 1187, wherein the author posited that unfair
competition is the other side of the antitrust coin and stated: "To attain our dual goals
[free competition and fair competition], we must eliminate fraud without preventing
competition; in preserving competition, we must not immunize fraud." Id.
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relationship, and should not have its protection under state law stripped
away. Because the state interest in fostering commercial integrity is not
inconsistent with the policy behind the patent laws, 72 it should not be
thought to succumb to the federal interest in free competition without
careful consideration of the consequences. It is submitted that competition
is only free when it is also fair.
The final issue considered by the Court was whether the patent policy
of disclosure, "the quid pro quo of the right to exclude, ' 73 would be frustrated by the continued existence of trade secret protection of articles
which are proper subjects for consideration under the patent laws. A
concomitant concern, according to the Court, was whether inventors would
lose the incentive to apply for a patent if trade secret protection were available. 74 The Court, in its analysis of this issue, relied heavily upon the
opinion in Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc.,751 wherein Judge Friendly distinguished three categories of trade secrets: 1) the trade secret believed
by its owner to constitute a validly patentable invention; 2) the trade
secret known to its owner not to be so patentable; and 3) the trade secret
76
whose valid patentability is considered dubious.
As to the trade secret known by its owner not to be patentable, the
Court first concluded that the patent policy of disclosure would not be
furthered by eliminating trade secret protection. The mere filing of applications for patents on unpatentable inventions predestined to be rejected
by the Patent Office would not add to the public store of knowledge because
such applications are held in confidence by law. 77 Second, the Court noted
that while research and development would continue in the absence of
trade secret protection, there would be a resultant increase in associated
expenses necessitated by the desire to maintain the value of any idea
which might be developed. Additionally, since a vital part of trade secret
law is the recognition of know-how licensing, the abolition of such protection would have the effect of encouraging the hoarding of knowledge
rather than its dissemination for the public benefit. 78 Finally, the Court
concluded that patent law does not necessarily forbid the states from acting
to prevent industrial espionage because the states have a substantial interest in enabling their citizens to avoid the increased private costs
72. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra.
73. 416 U.S. at 484, citing Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 322 U.S.
471, 484 (1944).
74. 416 U.S. at 484.
75. 442 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1971). See note 40 supra.
76. Id. at 224. The Court in Kewanee noted that trade secret protection in these
categories would run against breaches of confidence, and theft and other forms of industrial espionage. 416 U.S. at 484.
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1970). In addition, abandoned applications are not open
to public inspection. 37 C.F.R. § 1.14(b) (1974).
78. 416 U.S. at 486. The holder of a trade secret would be reluctant to share his
idea with a manufacturer who could not be placed under a binding legal obligation.
There is also the likelihood of duplication of effort and expense. See 84 HARv. L.
REV. 477, 482-84 (1970).
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incurred to protect trade secrets from industrial espionage which would
.arise if trade secret protection were terminated; and because "the state
79
interest in denying profit to such illegal ventures is unchallengeable."
The next category of trade secrets which the Court considered was
that of the invention whose holder had a legitimate doubt as to its patent-ability. The Court declared that trade secret protection of such inventions
-did not conflict with the patent policy of disclosure, reasoning that continued trade secret protection would assist inventors in the more efficient
-exploitation of their discoveries because the risk of eventual patent invalidity and the high cost of patent litigation that exist regardless of the
.availability of trade secret protection might impel some inventors to avoid
the trouble of seeking a patent, thereby delaying disclosure. s0 In any
,event, the rewards of patent protection are so far superior to those of
trade secret protection that any doubts as to the choice of protection would
probably be resolved in favor of patent protection. 8 ' Finally, the Court
.stated that it was quite possible that without trade secret protection, inventions which do not presently deserve patent protection might receive it
82
and the validity of those patents might never be challenged in court.
In the Court's view, this occurrence would not be balanced by the "specu3
lative gain" of encouraging patent applications. 3
The Court's view of the effect of continued state protection of clearly
unpatentable and doubtfully patentable inventions may be criticized upon
the grounds that the patent policy of disclosure as enunciated in the SearsCompco and Lear decisions has been effectively annulled. A literal reading
of the language of those cases would lead one to the conclusion that, absent
federal patent protection, any article may be freely copied by all; in other
words, by setting up standards of patentability, Congress intended that discoveries consisting of patentable subject matter which did not deserve a
patent should be availed no other protection.8 4 However, rather than annulling those decisions, the Kewanee decision can be read as clarifying the
interaction of state and federal interests in the protection of ideas, an issue
which was not conclusively determined in the previous decisions because
the factual background in those cases did not require a specific resolution
of the question of whether the state interest in the protection of trade
secrets was preempted by the operation of the patent laws. In Sears and
79. 416 U.S. at 487. See Note, supra note 16, at 828.

80. 416 U.S. at 487.
81. Id. at 487. The patent monopoly for a valid patent is statutorily guaranteed
for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). A trade secret monopoly must be judicially

enforced and exists only as long as it remains secret. For other advantages of patent
over trade secret protection, see MILGRIM, supra note 12, 8.02[8].
82. 416 U.S. at 488-89.
83. Id. at 489.
84. As the Sears Court observed:
States could allow perpetual protection to articles too lacking in novelty to merit
any patent at all under federal constitutional standards. This would be too great
an encroachment on the federal patent system to be tolerated.
376 U.S. at 232.
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Compco especially, the Court was faced with distinct factual situations involving items, subject to invalid patents, which were already in the public
domain and which were protected by a state law not primarily intended to
promote innovation and discovery.85
The final category which the Court considered was the clearly patentable invention, an area wherein "the federal interest in disclosure is at its
peak."" The Court's standard for determining whether a particular state
scheme of protection over clearly patentable inventions conflicted with
federal patent law was described as follows:
If a State, through a system of protection, were to cause a substantial
risk that holders of patentable inventions would not seek patents ...
we would be compelled to 8hold
that such a system could not consti7
tutionally continue to exist.
The Court concluded that the existence of trade secret law in general
creates no reasonable risk of deterrence from patent application because
the former provides for "weaker protection" than patent law in several
respects.88 First, trade secret law does not prohibit discovery by others
through legitimate methods; patent law, on the other hand, is effective
against any user by reason of a grant of exclusive rights to the inventor.8 9
Second, the trade secret owner runs the risk of losing his secret to competitors in a manner which might be impossible to prove in court, if not
90
difficult to discover.
The Court also discussed the disclosure issue by addressing the question of whether technological progress would be thwarted if inventors
chose trade secret protection. According to the Court, even if the owner
of a trade secret were to shun available patent protection, there would exist
the very real chance that other research scientists, both in private industry
and in academic circles, would discover the secret shortly thereafter, thereby avoiding the risk that society might be deprived of valuable information. 91
At the conclusion of this examination of the impact of state protection
of clearly patentable inventions upon patent law, the Court recognized that
85. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra.

86. 416 U.S. at 489.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 489-90. The Court stated:
The possibility that an inventor who believes his invention meets the standards
of patentability will sit back, rely on trade secret law, and after one year of use
forfeit any right to patent protection ... is remote indeed.
Id. at 490 (citation omitted).
89. Id. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
90. 416 U.S. at 490, citing Painton & Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 224
(2d Cir. 1971). The secret may be leaked in such a manner, gradually, for example,
that agreements with licensees or employees may become useless. A breach of such
agreements under such circumstances might be impossible to prove in court.
91. 416 U.S. at 490, citing R. MERTON, Singletons and Multiples in Science
(1961), in THE SOCIOLOGY OF ScIENcE 343 (1973) ; J. COLE & S. COLE, SOCIAL STRATIFICATION IN SCIENCE 12-13, 229-30 (1973); Ogburn & Thomas, Are Inventions
Inevitablef, 37 POL. ScI. QUART. 83 (1922). The label given to this phenomenon by
the Kewanee Court was the "ripeness of time concept." 416 U.S. at 490.
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it had presented a less persuasive argument in this area than it had in the
areas of doubtfully patentable and unpatentable inventions. 92 Even assuming that there should be a subordination of state protection of clearly
patentable inventions to federal law, the Court wrote, a system of partial
preemption would create an overwhelming burden upon state courts in the
administration of trade secret law because they would be forced to determine the patentability of inventions without the benefit of federal expertise. 93
Finally, the Court concluded its consideration of the issues by noting
that trade secret law and patent law have peacefully coexisted in this country for many years, and the operation of the patent system does not take
away the need for trade secret protection. In other words, "[u]ntil Congress takes affirmative action to the contrary, States should be free to grant
' ' 94
protection to trade secrets.

Mr. Justice Marshall's concurring opinion brought out a weakness
present in the Court's analysis of the effect of trade secret protection over
clearly patentable discoveries, specifically in its characterization of trade
secret law as "weaker protection" than patent law. Justice Marshall succinctly stated that there is a strong possibility in certain circumstances that
an inventor with a clearly patentable discovery will rely upon trade secret
protection rather than seek a patent. 95 In analyzing trade secret law in
general, the Court apparently had not recognized a situation wherein an
inventor could reasonably presume that the secret, if produced for sale,
would not be discovered before some lapse in time; he could insure secrecy
through contractual arrangements and there would be no need to patent
the discovery, thereby clearly frustrating the patent policy of disclosure.
An additional factor that might have an effect upon the incentive to apply
for a patent which the Court did not discuss, but which concerned the dissenting Justices, 96 is the permissible scope of trade secret injunctions.
Granting an injunction within a limited field of competition can have the
effects of creating a monopoly within the field and delaying disclosure.9 7
Without some limits upon the duration of the injunction some courts might
92. 416 U.S. at 491.
93. Id. at 491-92.
94. Id. at 493.
95. Id. at 493-95 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall viewed the fact
that trade secret law offers indefinite protection while a patent is limited to 17 years
as the primary attraction of the former scheme. Nevertheless, he ultimately agreed
with the majority because he believed that Congress, by having acquiesced in a dual
system for many years, had not intended state law to be preempted. Id. at 494.
96. Id. at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The dissent was of the view that a
permanent injunction against the defendants in the instant case would clearly conflict
with patent policy because it would be granting a perpetual monopoly. Id.
It should be noted that trade secret injunctions which have been granted by
the lower court have not been models of specificity. See Kane, Injunctive Relief
Under Trade Secret Law: The Fatal Flaw, 53 J.PAT. OFF. Soc'y 797 (1971).
97. See Comment, supra note 22, at 567. A possible solution is to structure the
injunction to limit its duration to the period required for a competitor to manufacture the article legitimately. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and
Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Comment, supra note 22, at 563-64.
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reach inequitable results. 98 Hence, in these instances, the Court by its
own standards of deterrence to patent application would be forced to declare
such state laws and decisions to be in conflict with federal patent policy.
Nevertheless, the advantages of abolishing trade secret protection
over clearly patentable inventions to ensure that in these relatively few
instances there will be no conflict with patent policy would seem to be outweighed by the disadvantages of the system of partial preemption that
would result. 99 Moreover, preemption of state protection over all patentable subject matter, while being more advantageous, would still create
those difficulties outlined by the Kewanee Court. 10 0 In other words, partial preemption of clearly patentable inventions would necessitate two
issues' resolution by a court before trade secret protection would be deemed
available: 1) whether there is patentable subject matter; and 2) whether
an invention fulfills the other requirements for a patent. 10 1 In contrast,
partial preemption in the broader category of patentable subject matter
would result in only one determination's being required - whether there
is patentable subject matter. In both cases, it is submitted that initial
resolution of the specific questions is better left to the expertise of the
Patent Office.
The Court has, by its decision in Kewanee, reasserted that the protection a state may offer against predatory and unethical business practices
does not conflict with, and, in fact, complements the protection offered by
the patent laws. The test apparently is rather loosely drawn - would a
given state law's protection deter an owner of a discovery from seeking
patent protection? - yet the Court at no point in its opinion suggested
at what point a state law might lead to such deterrence. The possibility
is not remote that there will be decisions in the lower courts which will
follow the spirit of Kewanee without considering its ramifications, thereby
98. For a view of the opposite ends of the spectrum, compare Shellmar Prods.
Co. v. Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 695
(1937) (court enjoined confidential disclosee from ever using trade secret, even after
disclosure, because of his unethical conduct) with Conmar Prods. Corp. v. Universal
Slide Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1949) (court refused to provide remedy
against innocent disclosee once secret had been made public).
99. See note 92 and accompanying text supra. But see Note, supra note 16, at
829-34, wherein the author argued that Congress intended a partially preemptive
scheme so that clearly patentable inventions could not be protected by trade secret law.
The author attempted to rebut the expertise argument by noting that state courts
are considered qualified to adjudicate federal issues, they already decide patent issues
in specific circumstances, and under partial preemption would, in effect, merely be
performing an existing judicial function of the review of patent validity without the
benefit of a prior Patent Office determination, which the author considers insignificant.
Id. at 831-32 & nn.112-15.
100. Under this system, only discoveries which were not patentable subject matter
could be protected under state law, a view advocated by Justice Douglas. 416 U.S.
at 497 n.3. One commentator has suggested that preemption of patentable subject
matter would be inappropriate because there would be no conflict with patent policy
and the inventor would be left with no protection in this area. Note, supra note 16,
at 829 n.106. However, he failed to address the argument that perhaps Congress
intended such an invention to be undeserving of any protection.
101. See notes 16-18 and accompanying text supra.
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